Any thought that happens inside our minds is undoubtedly our own thought – and after we say, “I feel”, there might be absolutely no mistake concerning the “I” to which we refer. In fact, only only a few of us would even query whether we’re considering our own thoughts, and those that do are almost certainly pursuing a philosophical enquiry moderately than physically questioning the character of 1’s considering. Isn’t “I feel, due to this fact I’m” probably the most basic of all prerequisites for one’s existence?
For a small minority, nevertheless, with the ability to think one’s own thoughts just isn’t all the time a given condition and even applicable to this “I”. Some report having thoughts being put into their heads by one other person, or just “receiving” external thoughts originating from an out of doors source – an experience which, unsurprisingly perhaps, could be extremely frightening.
How is something like this even remotely possible? The answer is, it isn’t. At least not with our current understanding of the laws of physics. As a result, this experience of severe interference is termed “thought insertion”and is defined as one in every of the important thing delusions – a “first-rank symptom” – indicative of a schizophrenic illness. Compared with some delusions which may just carry a touch of reality (reminiscent of believing neighbours are spreading rumours about you), thought insertion appears to be probably the most bizarre of all of them.
Delusions as beliefs
Current psychiatric diagnostic systems view delusions as beliefs. For a certain idea to be delusional, someone must first consider in this concept, often with absolute conviction, even when faced with evidence on the contrary. In my view, nevertheless, thought insertions don’t all the time slot in with this definition, and so don’t qualify as delusions.
If one investigates the actual subjective experience of thought insertion – beyond what’s written in clinical files and medical textbooks –- the richness and even reality of the experience begins to emerge. Orthodox definitions of delusion are being increasingly challenged by philosophically-minded researchers; psychotic or not, individuals experiencing external thoughts often find it extremely difficult to place into words “what it’s like” to have such thoughts. Some of them report these thoughts as sensory, even auditory (but still claim they’re thoughts and never voices); others can quite literally feel the “point of entry” to a certain locality inside their minds.
In fact, the boundary between considering and perception is so blurred that one person used the term “thought-voices” to explain her experiences.
Then what is believed insertion, if it just isn’t all the time a delusion? I argue that thought insertion is a duplex phenomenon which can or will not be a delusion.
The delusion could also be created by having thoughts wherein someone has lost their sense of agency (the sensation that a given thought is generated by one’s self), and ownership, (the endorsement that this thought belongs to at least one’s self). But agency and ownership usually are not all or nothing conceptsneither do they all the time come hand-in-hand – you may, for instance, feel such as you generated a thought but that it isn’t yours, so though you will have agency, there isn’t a ownership.
Depending on how much of 1’s sense of agency and ownership is lost or damaged in relation to a given thought, it could feel unfamiliar and even alien. But it is barely when an external attribution to a different agent occurs, for instance, “this thought is given to me by Chris”, can we call it a delusion.
In other words, simply having a foreign thought just isn’t a delusion in itself, though it could fairly often result in a delusional explanation.
The experience of thought insertion could be sensory, perceptual or physical. So, to me, it’s more appropriate to say “delusions in thought insertion” moderately than “delusions of thought insertion”, and I’m not only playing a game of lexicon. It is crucial to distinguish the processes that produce these acts of considering and the thoughts that ensue, irrespective of how much such notions challenge our common sense.
Some of us may argue there may be nothing a couple of delusion that’s value listening to, let alone explain, since the implausibility and apparent meaninglessness is beyond what a “rational” person could ever understand. But by acknowledging the complexity and mystery of thought insertion, clinicians might just be somewhat more understanding towards their patients’ subjective experiences. By removing the idea that every one thought interference is delusional by nature, we close the gap between “us normal people” and “those mad people”.
Even in cases where delusions are present, they still carry essential meanings concerning the individual. Before we make assumptions and call someone delusional, perhaps we must always query our own “reality” as well.